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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over thi s appeal b y virtue of t h e
Order of t h e Utah Supreme Court dated January 2 0 , II 994, a n d Utah
Code I nn , S 78 • 2a 3(2) (I \ .) (] 993 Ci in

Sopp ) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AMD STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Appellee J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc.

submits the following
- j iilis. o!" li-ippel ,1 ate

review,

disagrees with the issuer

framed b y t h e appellant

A . B . P . E n t e r p r i s e s , I n c . d b a A.B.P. Development Company

("ABP").

review are a s follows:
1.

Whether

subcontractor

Clark

Mechanical

J

negligence

: t .u general contractor, A B P , where t h e subcontract

between JB a n d Clark does not even mention A B P , and d o e s n o t
uneqUivocal]

y

eX

preS!

£ntent

tjia

indemnify a n y party for that party's o w n negligence?
2.

Whether indemnification for ABP's o w n negligence should
ubcontract between J B a n d L'J.ark, where it. is

not expressed I>j J B and Clark, and t h e Utah courts have n o t
allowed such indemnificatio
3.

mplied?

Whether, i n v i w

indemnity provisions

t;

, 1. LLy Reform Act, the

ubcontract between

Clark
r

should be re-

1

express an intent, not held by the parties, to indemnify ABP for
its own negligence?
4.
urged

Whether the interpretation of the construction contract
by ABP, which

interpretation

would

allow ABP

to be

indemnified for its own negligence as well as its sole negligence,
would render the contract void under Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1?
5*

Whether the indemnity provisions in the contracts may be

invalidated as violative of public policy because they were not
bargained or negotiated for with equal bargaining power?
6.

Whether the district court's decision is sustainable on

any proper ground?
The applicable standard of appellate review on all of these
issues is correction of error and this Court reviews the district
court's decision under the same standard employed by the district
court under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Briggs
v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987).

The appellate court

should affirm the district court decision if it is sustainable on
any proper ground.

Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860,

861 (Utah 1979).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statute is determinative in this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1.
indemnify.

Construction industry—Agreements to

A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in,
or in connection with or collateral to, a contract or
agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair
or maintenance of a building, structure, highway,
2

appurtenance and appliance, including moving, demolition
and excavating connected therewith, purporting to
indemnify the promisee against liability for damages
arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to
property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence
of the promisee, his agents or employees, or indemnitee,
is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.
This act will not be construed to affect or impair
the obligations of contracts or agreements, which are in
existence at the time the act becomes effective.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
This action involved a claim for personal injuries resulting
from an accident at a construction site in Orem, Utah.

The

plaintiff, Richard Healey, and his co-employee were laying wire
mesh preparatory to the pouring of concrete on the second level of
a building under construction.

While in the process of their

work, the plaintiff and his co-employee moved a section of heating
duct that was covering an opening in the floor.

The plaintiff

fell through the opening and brought suit for his personal
injuries against the general contractor, ABP; the mechanical
subcontractor, Clark; and the sheet metal sub-subcontractor, JB.
The plaintiff's complaint set forth six separate causes of
action against the defendants.

ABP filed a cross-claim against

Clark and JB, and a third-party complaint against the plaintiff's
employer alleging that ABP was entitled to be fully indemnified
for any liability sustained.

ABP's cross-claims and third-party

complaint against the plaintiffs employer relied, in part, upon

3

a contract entered into between ABP and Clark, and a contract
entered into between ABP and the plaintiff's employer.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below»
ABP filed a motion for summary judgment on its cross-claim
against Clark for indemnification on November 13, 1992.
1053.)

On December 21, 1992, Clark filed a cross-motion for

summary judgment seeking dismissal of ABP's cross-claim.
2123.)

(R.

(R.

By memorandum decision dated February 10, 1993, the

district court denied ABP's motion for summary judgment and
granted Clark's cross-motion.

(R. 1720 and Exhibit C.)

The

court's order was entered on March 9, 1993, denying ABP's motion
and granting Clark's cross-motion on the basis that the indemnity
provisions of the contract between ABP and Clark made reference to
liability that may arise from Clark's performance of the contract,
but could not reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent
of the parties that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.
(R. 2058 and Exhibit D.)
On November 27, 1992, ABP filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of indemnity against JB.

(R. 1186.)

On

December 18, 1992, JB filed a cross-motion for partial summary
judgment on ABP's cross-claim against JB for indemnification. (R.
1272.)

In the court's memorandum decision dated February 10,

1993, the court denied ABP's motion for partial summary judgment.
(R. 1720 and Exhibit C.) The court's order denying the motion was
4

entered on March 9, 1993. (R. 2058 and Exhibit D.) By memorandum
decision dated June 21, 1993, the court granted JB's cross-motion
for

summary

judgment

indemnification.

against

ABP

on

the

cross-claim

for

(R. 2143 and Exhibit E.) The court's order was

entered on September 13, 1993 granting JB's cross-motion for
summary judgment on ABP's cross-claim, finding that there was no
contractual privity between ABP and JB, and that ABP had failed to
establish that it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the
indemnity provisions of the contract between Clark and JB.
court

further based

its decision upon the ground

The

that the

indemnity provisions could not reasonably be interpreted as
evidencing any intent of the parties that JB indemnify ABP for
ABP's own negligence.

(R. 2174 and Exhibit F.)

On June 21, 1993, Clark filed a motion for judgment on its
cross-claim for indemnification against JB.

(R. 2120.) JB filed

a cross-motion for summary judgment on the cross-claim on July 1,
1993.

(R. 2146.)

By memorandum decision dated October 4, 1993,

the court granted JB's cross-motion for summary judgment.

(R.

2176 and Exhibit G.) The court's order was entered on October 18,
1993 dismissing Clark's cross-claim against JB based on the ground
that the indemnity provisions could not reasonably be interpreted
as evidencing any intent of the parties that JB indemnify Clark
for Clark's own negligence.

(R. 2180 and Exhibit H.)

The trial of this matter was scheduled to begin on March 15,
1993.

(R. 405.)

The plaintiff's claims were settled just prior
5

to the scheduled trial.
based

upon

the

Pursuant to stipulation of the parties,

settlement

of

the

plaintiff's

claims,

the

plaintiff's claims were dismissed with prejudice by order of the
court dated August 13f 1993.

(R. 2162, 2166.)

Statement of Facts,
1.

This action involved

a claim for personal injuries

arising out of a fall at a construction site on March 7, 1991.
The plaintiff was employed by Gene Peterson Concrete at the time
of the accident and was performing work on behalf of Peterson
Concrete when the accident occurred.
2.

(R. 102.)

In the process of Peterson Concrete's work, the plaintiff

and a co-employee moved a large section of heating duct, which was
covering a floor opening.

While moving the heating duct, the

plaintiff fell through the opening sustaining personal injuries.
(R. 101.)
3.

Plaintiff filed his complaint against ABP, Clark and JB,

alleging various causes of action.
plaintiff's allegations against it.
denied the allegations.

(R. 104.)

JB denied the

(R. 134.) ABP and Clark also

(R. 113, 236.)

ABP also filed cross-

claims against Clark and JB, and a third-party complaint against
the plaintiff's employer seeking indemnification.
4.

(R. 1255.)

Plaintiff's amended complaint alleged six separate causes

of action.

These causes included allegations that ABP had

breached various independent duties as the general contractor.
Five of the causes were alleged against all defendants. The sixth
6

cause of action was alleged against ABP only.

As part of the

first cause of action, a negligence claim was brought against ABP
alleging that, as the general contractor on the construction site,
ABP retained control over portions of the construction, that ABP
had a duty to provide a safe place to work, and that ABP had a
general and coordinating authority, both for the completion of the
work and compliance with safety standards.
5.

(R. 99.)

As part of the third cause of action, the plaintiff

alleged that ABP had a non-delegable duty to furnish a safe place
to work and that this duty was breached leading to plaintiff's
injuries.
6.
against

(R. 95.)

Plaintiff's sixth cause of action was asserted solely
ABP

as

the

construction site.

alleged

owner

of

the

premises

of

the

This cause of action alleged that ABP had a

duty to inspect and maintain its premises in a reasonably safe
condition or to warn any business invitees of any dangerous
conditions.
7.

(R. 92.)

The other causes of action set forth in the plaintiff's

amended complaint alleged various breaches of duty on the part of
each of the defendants, including ABP.
8.

(R. 104-88.)

ABP was the general contractor on the project and

contracted the mechanical work to Clark. The contract between ABP
and Clark ("ABP Agreement") contained the following provisions
under which ABP claimed a right of indemnification against Clark:

7

5.

LIABILITY.

(a) General Liability: Sub-contractor shall indemnify and
save General Contractor, its officers or agents harmless
from and against any and all loss, damage, injury,
liability, and claims thereof for injuries to or death of
persons, and all loss of or damage to property of others,
resulting directly or indirectly from Sub-Contractor's
performance of this contract.
(d) Employer's Liability: Sub-contractor shall perform
the work hereunder in conformance with all applicable
Federal and State labor laws, and shall indemnify and save
General Contractor harmless from any and all liability,
claims, costs, and expenses of whatsoever nature under
such laws arising out of the performance of this contract.
(R. 1253.) A copy of the entire ABP Agreement is attached in the
addendum as Exhibit A.
9.

JB was a subcontractor to Clark, providing labor and

material for the installation of duct work for air distribution in
the building.
JB.

JB's

There was no contractual privity between ABP and

contractual

responsibilities

were

set

out

by

a

subcontract between Clark and JB ("Clark Agreement").
The provisions of the Clark Agreement relied upon by ABP in
its brief provide:
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all
the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor
assumes toward the Owner.
The Subcontractor shall
indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and save
them harmless from, any and all loss, damage, expenses,
costs, and attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on account
of any breach of the provisions or covenants of this
contract.
Subcontractor agrees to fully comply with the
Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 and any and all
regulations issued pursuant thereto. Subcontractor as a
term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and save
the contractor harmless from any claims or charges of any
8

kind by reason of subcontractor failing to fully comply
with the act and regulations and agrees to reimburse the
contractor for any fines, damages, or expenses of any kind
incurred
by
the
contractor
by
reason
of
the
subcontractor's failure to comply.
(R. 1237.)

A copy of the entire Clark Agreement is attached in

the Addendum as Exhibit B.
10.
1993.

The trial of this case was set to begin on March 15,
(R. 405.)

The trial did not occur, however, as the

plaintiff's claims were settled prior to trial.

As a result,

there have been no findings of fact with regard to any party's
alleged negligence or the apportionment of negligence. Based upon
the settlement, the parties stipulated that the plaintiff's claims
could be dismissed with prejudice, and an order of dismissal was
entered by the court on August 13, 1993.

(R. 2162, 2166.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I.

The

district

court

granted

summary

judgment

dismissing ABP's cross-claims for indemnification against both
Clark and JB.

This Court reviews the decision of the district

court for error, applying the same standard as that applied by the
trial court. The decision should be affirmed, however, if it is
sustainable on any proper ground, even if the ground was not
relied upon by the district court.
Point II. Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals have recently reconfirmed that the strict construction
rule applies in the State of Utah to indemnification agreements
that are alleged to indemnify a party for that party's own
9

negligence.

The reasons for the strict construction rule are

sound. A party should not be able to rid itself of responsibility
for its own negligence and place that responsibility upon another
party by vague or general language.

If responsibility for a

party's negligence is shifted to another party, that intention and
understanding of the parties should be clearly and unequivocally
expressed. The presumption is against any such intention, and the
intention should not be inferred or implied.
Point

III. ABP

blanketly

claims

beneficiary of the Clark Agreement.

to

be

a

third-party

It has failed to establish

that it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity
provisions

of

the

Clark Agreement, and

continues

to refer

generally to various provisions in the Clark Agreement and ABP
Agreement without carefully analyzing the indemnity provisions.
There is no contractual privity between ABP and JB, and JB did not
assume the same obligations toward ABP that Clark assumed toward
ABP. Each agreement must be separately and carefully analyzed to
determine whether or not an intention to indemnify ABP for its own
negligence is clearly and unequivocally expressed.
The comparison of the contracts at issue with the contract in
Freund

v.

UP&L, demonstrates

indemnification provisions.

little

similarity

between

the

The agreement in Freund was broad-

sweeping in its scope, providing UP&L with full and complete
indemnification from any claims of whatever nature arising out of
the attachment of cable equipment to utility poles owned by UP&L.
10

The Freund agreement is not similar to the agreements here. The
fact that some of the terms utilized in the Freund agreement also
appear in the agreements at issue does not make the agreements
similar. The indemnity provisions in the Clark Agreement provide
that JB will indemnify Clark and WordPerfect Corp. against losses
incurred on account of any breach of the Clark Agreement by JB,
and further provide that JB will indemnify Clark for any fines
levied and expenses incurred by reason of JB's failure to comply
with OSHA. The indemnity provision in the ABP Agreement provides
that Clark will indemnify ABP from losses and claims for injuries
to persons, or loss to property of others, resulting directly or
indirectly from Clark's performance of the contract. There is no
expression whatsoever of any intent to indemnify ABP for its own
negligence in either agreement. There is not even any mention of
ABP in the Clark Agreement between Clark and JB.

There is

likewise no broad-sweeping indemnification language such as that
found in Freund.
ABP's reliance upon cases from other jurisdictions construing
indemnity agreements is seriously misguided.
apply

more

liberal

rules

of

These cases often

construction,

indemnification for a party's own negligence.

and

imply

The indemnity

provisions in the cases cited are also too dissimilar to aid in
interpreting the provisions in the ABP Agreement and the Clark
Agreement.

11

ABP fails to cite this Court to the most recent decision by
the Utah Supreme Court concerning an indemnity provision.
Ericksen

v,

Salt

Lake

City

Corp., the

Utah

Supreme

In

Court

considered an indemnity provision that is much more similar to the
provision in the ABP Agreement than any of the provisions in the
cases

cited

by

ABP.

The

provision

in

Ericksen

provided

indemnification for claims arising out of any act or failure to
act by the contractor in the performance and execution of the
agreement.

The court specifically rejected the indemnitor's

contention that the agreement was similar to the Freund contractf
noting that Freund was much broader in its sweep. The analysis in
Ericksen

requires

that

ABP's

claim

for

indemnification

be

rejected.
Point IV. ABP

contends

that Utah's Liability

Reform Act

shelters it from any other party's negligence, and that the only
purpose for the indemnity provisions is to provide indemnification
for its own negligence. ABP therefore urges the Court to read the
Liability Reform Act into the contracts and imply indemnification
for ABP's own negligence.

This is a new argument raised for the

first time on appeal and should not be considered here.

This

argument would also raise new factual issues concerning whether or
not the effect of the Liability Reform Act was considered and
whether or not the indemnity provisions were in fact drafted after
the effective date of the Act.
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ABP essentially asks the Court to rewrite the contracts.

It

is a fundamental principle of contract construction that a court
may not make a new contract for the parties or rewrite the
contract under the guise of construction. The contracts should be
interpreted as written.
The principle of contract construction that, between two
otherwise reasonable interpretations, preference may be given to
the one that will make the agreement lawful and valid, does not
allow for a rewriting of the contract to give it the legal effect
desired by one party.

Some language, when properly interpreted,

may have no legal effect, or may have a legal effect other than
what the parties in fact intended.

The strict construction rule

requires that indemnification for one's own negligence be clearly
and unequivocally expressed. This rule of contract interpretation
is

specific

to

the

issues

here

and

should

govern

the

interpretation. The indemnity provisions should not be construed
as suggested by ABP simply to render them legally effective. The
indemnity provisions at issue, in fact, have certain legal effects
and various reasons for indemnity provisions remain under current
law.
Point V.

The contracts do not expressly provide for the

indemnification sought by ABP. If the indemnification language is
read

to

indemnify

ABP

for ABP's

own

negligence,

such

an

interpretation would also allow for indemnification for ABP's sole
negligence.

There is no exception in the agreement for losses
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arising out of ABP's sole negligence•

Such an interpretation of

the indemnification provisions would be against public policy and
would render them void and unenforceable under Utah Code Ann. §
13-8-1.
Point VI. It has been recognized that indemnity agreements may
be in violation of public policy where they have resulted from a
disparity of bargaining power, or negotiations conducted at less
than arm's length. The contracts at issue were not drafted by JB.
The indemnity provisions were not negotiated.

Equal bargaining

generally does not exist in the preparation of construction
contracts.

The ABP Agreement is a form agreement that has been

utilized by ABP for six years. The indemnity provisions should be
invalidated as they were not bargained for or negotiated for at
arm's length.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court entered summary judgment dismissing ABP's
cross-claim for indemnification against JB after reviewing lengthy
memoranda filed by both parties in conjunction with cross-motions
for summary judgment.

This Court reviews the district court's

order under the same standard employed by the district court under
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Briggs v. Holcomb,
740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987).

Summary judgment is granted when
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there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Although this Court reviews the district court decision for
correction of error without according deference to the trial
courts legal conclusions, under standards of appellate review,
this Court should affirm the district court if its decision is
sustainable on any proper ground.

The Utah Supreme Court has

stated that:
Under the rules of appellate review, we affirm the trial
court if we can do so on any proper ground even if the
court below assigned an incorrect reason for its ruling.
Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979).

See

also Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah
1988).

This rule of appellate review applies even if the proper

ground was not raised in or considered by the lower court, and
even if the proper ground is not urged on appeal.

Goodsel v.

Department of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah
1974).
POINT II
THE STRICT CONSTRUCTION RULE APPLIES IN INTERPRETING ANY
AGREEMENT THAT IS ALLEGED TO INDEMNIFY A PARTY FOR THAT
PARTY'S OWN NEGLIGENCE. THIS RULE HAS NOT BEEN, AND
SHOULD NOT BE, RELAXED.
In seeking indemnification for its own negligence, ABP urges
this Court to relax the rule of strict construction in accordance
with an alleged growing trend to relax the rule.

ABP contends

that the Utah Supreme Court took the first step toward relaxing
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the strict construction rule in Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co..
793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990).

While both this Court and the Utah

Supreme Court have acknowledged that some states have relaxed the
strict construction rule, however, the rule has been upheld and
reconfirmed in its application to indemnity provisions that are
alleged to provide indemnification for one's own negligence.
The Utah Supreme Court in Freund reconfirmed the application
of the strict construction rule in the State of Utah, citing a
long line of cases:
In a long line of cases spanning more than fifty years,
we have repeatedly held that an indemnity agreement
which purports to make a party respond for the
negligence of another should be strictly construed.
[Citations omitted.] A party is contractually obligated
to assume ultimate financial responsibility for the
negligence of another only when that intention is
"clearly and unequivocally expressed."
Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
This Court has also acknowledged the applicability of the
strict construction rule in recent cases.

See Pickhover v.

Smith/s Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1989) and Gordon
v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991).
In Pickhover, this Court reviewed some of the reasons for the
strict construction rule as follows:
The strict construction rule seems to have arisen
primarily to appease the concern that one who is not
financially responsible for the consequences of his or
her own negligence will be less careful in his or her
behavior toward others. See e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d at 913. Under the strict
construction rule, a party is contractually obligated to
assume ultimate financial responsibility for the
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negligence of another "only when that intention is
clearly and unequivocally expressed." Id. at 914. "But
the presumption is against any such intention, and it is
not achieved by inference or implication from general
language . . .." Id.
Pickhover, at 667 (emphasis added).
In Gordon, this Court again reconfirmed the application of
the rule of strict construction and stated that "under this rule,
there is a presumption against an intent to indemnify unless 'that
intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed.'"
494.

Gordon. at

Gordon also noted that when construing indemnification

clauses, no intention to confer third-party beneficiary rights
will be inferred from the indemnity language alone.

Id.

ABP's argument that the rule of strict construction should be
relaxed or that the rule has already been relaxed is contrary to
recent and repeated pronouncements by both this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court.
sound.

The reasons for the strict construction rule are

Contrary to ABP's argument, the rule serves legitimate

purposes even today.

The fact that liability insurance is

commonplace in modern transactions does not undercut the reasons
for the rule.

A party should not be able to effectively pass

responsibility for its own negligence to another party by vague or
general language.

If an agreement places responsibility for one

party's negligence upon another party, such shifted responsibility
should be ultimately clear and unequivocal.

There should be no

room for mistake or misunderstanding on the part of the purported
indemnitor that it is assuming responsibility for the indemnitee's
17

negligence. Without a clear and unequivocal expression of such an
intent and understanding, there is a risk of confusion, and the
danger that the purported indemnitor does not understand its
responsibilities.

If

responsibility

its

for

a

party
own

seeks

negligence

to
by

rid

itself

placing

of
that

responsibility upon another party, such an arrangement must occur
by a clear meeting of the minds.

The reasons for the strict

construction rule remain sound. One should be responsible for his
or her own negligence unless that responsibility has been clearly
and unequivocally shifted.
ABP's argument that Utah's Comparative Fault Law eliminates
the need for the strict construction rule is without merit.
foregoing

reasons

apply

equally

under

the

current

The
law.

Furthermore, contrary to ABP's assertion, indemnity agreements can
have purposes other than seeking indemnification for one's own
negligence.

As an example, indemnity agreements may be used to

obtain indemnification for contractual defaults of the indemnitor
for which the indemnitee may be obligated to respond.
be discussed under Point IV,

This will

infra.

POINT III
THERE IS NO CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL EXPRESSION OF INTENT
ON THE PART OF JB TO INDEMNIFY ABP FOR ABP'S OWN
NEGLIGENCE.
In

an

attempt

to

find

clear

and unequivocal

language

indemnifying ABP for its own negligence, ABP asserts that the
indemnification language in this case is very similar to the
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language found in Freund and that Freund mandates indemnity for
ABP's own negligence. ABP's attempted comparison of the contract
in Freund with the contracts here demonstrates the absurdity of
its position.

The court in Freund held that the indemnity

provisions at issue, when analyzed as a whole, contained broad
sweeping indemnification language which expressed a clear and
unequivocal intent to indemnify UP&L for its own negligence.

It

is easily demonstrated that the agreements here are not similar to
the agreement in Freund.
A.

The Indemnity Provisions Must Be Carefully And Strictly
Construed. Indemnification For A Party's Own Negligence
Should Not Be Implied And Third-Party Beneficiary Rights
Should Not Be Implied.

An analysis of the indemnity provisions must begin with a
careful reading of the indemnity provisions themselves.

Not all

of the indemnity provisions referenced by ABP in this matter apply
to ABP's claim against JB.

There are two separate contracts at

issue. One contract is between ABP and Clark (the ABP Agreement),
and the other contract is between Clark and JB
Agreement).

(the Clark

ABP is now critical of the district court's ruling

that ABP had failed to establish that it was an intended thirdparty beneficiary
Agreement.

of the indemnity provisions of the Clark

In granting JB's cross-motion for summary judgment

against ABP, the court found and ruled as follows:
There is no contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B.
Sheet Metal, Inc., and ABP has failed to establish that
it is an intended third-party beneficiary of the
indemnity provisions of the contract between Clark
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Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc.
The Court further finds that the indemnity provisions
cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any
intent of the parties that J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc.
indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence.
See Order and Judgment, dated 9/13/93. (R. 2174 and Exhibit F.)
ABP argues that the district court7s order is not in harmony
with Utah law regarding third-party beneficiary rights. What ABP
fails to recognize is that the district court found that ABP had
failed to establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of the
indemnity provisions of the subcontract agreement between JB and
Clark. In the memoranda filed with the district court by ABP, ABP
confused the indemnity provisions existing in the ABP agreement
and the Clark Agreement and based its claim against JB upon the
assertion that JB assumed the same obligations toward ABP that
Clark assumed toward ABP.

(See ABP's Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Issue

of

Indemnity,

R.

1182; and

Reply

Memorandum

of ABP

Enterprises, Inc. in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against JB Sheet Metal, Inc. and in
Opposition to JB Sheet Metal's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
R. 1528.)

The amended cross-claim filed by ABP against JB was

based upon the allegation that JB owed the same duties to ABP as
were owed by Clark.

(R. 1250.) ABP failed to carefully read the

indemnity provisions, and in fact confused the provisions in both
its cross-claim and its memoranda to the court in attempting to
obtain indemnification against JB, and somehow assumed that it was
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a third-party beneficiary of the indemnity provisions in the Clark
Agreement.
There is no contractual privity between ABP and JB.

No

intention to confer third-party beneficiary rights upon ABP should
be inferred from the indemnity language in the Clark Agreement.
Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, 820 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah App.
1991).

There is a presumption against any intent on the part of

JB

indemnify

to

unequivocally
unequivocal

ABP

unless

expressed.

that

intention

is clearly

and

Thus, there must be a clear and

expression in the Clark Agreement that JB will

indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence. No such intention can be
found in the agreement.
The pertinent provisions of the Clark Agreement provide as
follows:
The Subcontractor
[JB] assumes toward the
Contractor
[Clark]
all
the
obligations
and
responsibilities that the Contractor assumes toward the
Owner [WordPerfect Corp.].
The Subcontractor shall
indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and save
them harmless from, any and all loss, damage, expenses,
costs, and attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on
account of any breach of the provisions or covenants of
this contract.
Subcontractor agrees to fully comply with the
Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 and any and all
regulations issued pursuant thereto. Subcontractor as
a term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and
save the contractor harmless from any claims or charges
of any kind by reason of subcontractor failing to fully
comply with the act and regulations and agrees to
reimburse the contractor for any fines, damages, or
expenses of any kind incurred by the contractor by
reason of the subcontractor's failure to comply.
(Brackets added.)
21

It must first be noted that while JB assumes toward Clark all
the obligations and responsibilities that Clark assumes toward
WordPerfect Corp., there is nothing in the contract indicating
that JB assumes those obligations toward either WordPerfect Corp.
or ABP.

ABP has confused provisions from the two agreements and

has failed to establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of
the Clark Agreement.

The district court's ruling on this point

was correct.
Most importantly, with regard to the indemnification provided
by the Clark Agreement, the provision indicates only that JB shall
indemnify Clark and the owner [WordPerfect Corp.] against any loss
incurred or suffered on account of any breach by JB of the
provisions or covenants of the contract between Clark and JB.
This is a very limited indemnification and there is certainly no
clear and unequivocal expression of an intent to indemnify ABP for
anything, let alone for ABP's own negligence.
provision

is

very

liberally

construed,

Even if the

which

would

be

inappropriate under the strict construction rule or under other
standards

of

contract

construction,

there

is

no

expression

whatsoever of any intent to indemnify ABP for its own negligence.
The district court's decision was also correct on this point.
There is likewise no expression of intent to indemnify ABP
for its own negligence in the second paragraph quoted above from
the Clark Agreement.

In the second paragraph, JB agrees to fully

comply with the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 and to
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keep and save Clark harmless from any claims or charges by reason
of JB failing to fully comply with the Act and agrees to reimburse
Clark for any fines, damages or expenses of any kind incurred by
Clark by reason of JB's own failure to comply.

This indicates

that any fines levied or other expenses incurred by Clark because
of an OSHA violation by JB will be paid by JB although the fine
may be levied against Clark. There is certainly no expression in
this provision of an intent to indemnify ABP for ABP's own
negligence.

Furthermore, there were no fines levied by OSHA and

there was no breach of this provision of the contract.
It should also be noted that any liability that could have
been found against ABP in this matter would necessarily be based
upon ABP's own negligence, not upon JB's negligence or violation
of OSHA regulations. Further, negligence attributed to ABP could
not be based upon a violation of OSHA regulations, as both
congress and the Utah State legislature have expressly stated that
the OSHA Act and regulations do not provide a basis for any civil
liability.
20(2).

29 U.S.C. §

653(b)(4); and Utah Code Ann. § 35-9-

OSHA regulations were not intended to affect common law

rights and liabilities and can never provide a basis for civil
liability.

See Knapstad v. Smiths Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1

(Utah App. 1989).
As set forth above, the only reasonable interpretation of the
indemnity provision in the Clark Agreement, to which JB is a
party, is that JB agrees to indemnify Clark and WordPerfect Corp.
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against losses incurred on account of any breach by JB of the
provisions or covenants of the contract between JB and Clark. It
does not purport to indemnify any party for that party's own
negligence, and

certainly

does

not contain

broad

and all-

encompassing language such as that in Freund.
B.

The Indemnity Provisions In Freund v. UP&L Were Detailed
And Broad-Sweeping In Their Scope.
The Indemnity
Provisions In This Action Are Not "Similar" And Must Be
Independently And Strictly Construed.

A comparison of the indemnity provisions at issue with the
indemnity provisions found in Freund demonstrates the lack of
support for ABP's position.
Freund

was

extremely

The indemnification provision in

broad

and

expressly

provided

for

indemnification from any and all liability arising out of the
attachment of the cable equipment to utility poles owned by UP&L.
In Freund, the plaintiff was injured when he came into
contact with a power line as he was splicing amplifiers into a
television cable previously hung by a cable company on utility
poles owned by UP&L. The plaintiff brought suit against the cable
company and UP&L.

UP&L sought indemnification against the cable

company who was initially permitted to attach the cables to the
utility poles. In allowing the cable company to attach the cables
to the utility poles, an indemnification agreement was entered
into requiring the cable company to indemnify UP&L from any and
all liability. The Utah Supreme Court carefully analyzed, line by
line, the detailed indemnification agreement.
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The court found

that the first sentence of the provision provided for indemnity
from "any and all" liability arising out of the attachment of
cable equipment to the utility poles. The agreement specifically
provided that:
Licensee [Jones] shall indemnify, protect, and save
harmless Licensor [UP & L] from and against any and all
claims, demands, causes of action, costs or other
liabilities . . . which may arise out of or be connected
with the erection, maintenance, presence, use or removal
of Licensee/s equipment . . . .
Id. at 371 (emphasis original).

The court then stated:

It is true that this sentence does not specifically
mention the effect of any negligence on the part of the
licensor. However, the broad sweep of the language
employed by the parties clearly covers those instances
in which the licensor may be negligent. The parties
covered "any and all claims, demands, causes of action,
costs or other liabilities." The word "liabilities" is
particularly significant since it covers those instances
where the licensor is legally liable for damages,
including those where liability arises because of the
licensor's negligence.
Id.
The Freund court then noted that the third sentence of the
indemnification provision stated that the licensee shall provide
a legal defense to "any and all" suits brought by third parties
and shall "pay and satisfy" any such suit.

Id.

Finally, the

court noted that the indemnification provision ended with a
summary statement of what the parties intended to cover in the
previous three sentences concerning indemnification:
This indemnification agreement by Licensee in favor of
Licensor, shall provide Licensor with full and complete
indemnification, including defense of any suits, actions
or other legal proceedings resulting from any claims for
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damages • • • of whatever nature which shall be made or
assessed against Licensor in furnishing such poles under
the terms of this agreement or for any other thing done
or omitted in conjunction with Licensor's dealings with
Licensee.
Id.

(Emphasis

original.)

The

court

concluded

that

the

indemnification provision, as a whole, expressed a clear and
unequivocal

intent

by

the parties

that

the

licensee would

indemnify the licensor from any and all liabilities, including
liability that arises because of the licensor's negligence.
Without question, the indemnity provision in Freund expressed
a clear and unequivocal intent to indemnify UP&L for its own
negligence. It provided that the indemnitor would provide a legal
defense to any and all suits brought by third parties and would
pay and satisfy any such suit.

It further provided in a summary

statement that the indemnitor would provide the indemnitee with
full and complete indemnification, including defense of any suitsf
actions or other legal proceedings resulting from any claims for
damages to property and injury or death to persons and shall apply
to all claims, demands, suits, and judgments of whatever nature.
As characterized by the Utah Supreme Court, this language was
broad-sweeping and provided indemnification for the indemnitee's
own negligence.
In

stark

contrast

to

the

provisions

in

Freund,

the

indemnification provisions found in the Clark Agreement do not
even remotely satisfy the standards set forth by the Utah courts
before a party may be indemnified for its own negligence.
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The

first provision relied upon by ABP provides simply that JB will
indemnify Clark and "the Owner," WordPerfect Corp., against loss
incurred on account of any breach of the Clark Agreement by JB.
The owner is WordPerfect Corp., not ABP.

The second provision

relates to fines levied and expenses incurred by reason of failure
of JB to comply with OSHA.

The district court was correct in

ruling that the provisions could not reasonably be interpreted as
evidencing any intent of the parties that JB indemnify ABP for
ABP's own negligence.
The indemnity provisions in the ABP Agreement between ABP and
Clark also differ markedly from the provisions in Freund.

The

first provision at issue in the ABP Agreement provides that Clark
will indemnify ABP from loss, liability and claims for injuries to
persons, loss or damage to property of others, "resulting directly
or indirectly from [Clark's] performance of this contract," not
ABP's own conduct.

(Brackets added.) The second provision quoted

by ABP deals with Clark's obligation to perform its own work in
compliance with federal and state labor laws.

These cannot

reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties
that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.

(It must be

noted that JB is not a party to the ABP Agreement and JB has no
obligation to ABP under that agreement.)
Neither

the provisions

in the Clark Agreement

nor the

provisions in the ABP Agreement bear any close similarity to the
provisions in Freund.

The provisions must be independently and
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strictly

construed.

They

do

not

provide

broad-sweeping

indemnification language which clearly and unequivocally shifts
the burden of ABP's negligence upon either Clark or JB.

The

district courts decision was correct and should be affirmed.
C.

Cases From Other Jurisdictions Construing Indemnity
Agreements Often Apply Different Rules Of Construction
And Should Be Rejected. The Provisions Analyzed Are
Dissimilar And Do Not Aid In Interpreting The Provisions
Here.

The analysis followed by other jurisdictions may differ from
that used by the Utah courts and should therefore be rejected.
Most importantly, any indemnity provision must be carefully and
strictly

construed

on

its

own.

Interpretations

provisions by other courts is of little or no value.

of

other

The cases

cited by ABP from other jurisdictions demonstrate the problem.
The court in Fischbach-Natkin v. Power Process Piping, 403
N.W.2d 569 (Mich. App. 1987) found that the indemnity provision at
issue was

broad

and

clear, encompassing

all

liability

for

injuries, after examining the indemnity language, surrounding
circumstances, and the purpose sought to be accomplished by the
parties. The court did not utilize the rule of construction that
is used by the Utah courts, and expressly stated that the rule
requiring a clear and unequivocal expression in the contract that
one party

indemnify

another party

for the indemnitee's own

negligence was inapplicable under Michigan law.

Id. at 571.

The analysis by the court in Bosse v. Litton Unit Handling
Systems, Etc., 646 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1981) is likewise of little
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value*

The court

in Bosse read the agreement to provide

indemnification whenever the indemnitor was found to be at fault.
Because the jury found the indemnitor to be negligent, the court
reasoned that the plaintiff's injury was sustained by reason of an
act or omission of the indemnitor arising out of the work
performed under the agreement.

The court's analysis is not

helpful here. The indemnity provision at issue is too dissimilar
to be compared and the court's analysis is specific to the
particular indemnity provision.

Furthermore, the court rejected

the strict construction rule and construed the agreement like any
other contract.

Id. at 693.

The same problems exist in

Kirkpatrick & Associates v. Wickes Corp., 280 S.E.2d 632 (N.C.
App. 1981).

The indemnity provision there is not similar to the

provisions in either the Clark Agreement or the ABP Agreement, and
the court did not strictly construe the provision.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Public Service Co. v. United
Cable,

829

P.2d

1280

(Colo. 1992),

carefully

analyzed

the

indemnity provision at issue to find that an intent to indemnify
the

indemnitee

for

its

unequivocally expressed.
UP&L.

own

negligence

was

clearly

and

The case is very similar to Freund v.

The indemnity agreement provided that the licensee would

indemnify the electric company from all claims and liabilities in
any way arising out of the licensee's use of the electric
company's poles or facilities.

Id. at 1282.

similarity to the provisions in this matter.
29

There is little

In summary, an analysis of the construction placed by other
courts upon indemnification provisions is of little or no value in
construing the indemnity provisions at issue here. First of allf
other jurisdictions may apply different rules of construction.
Secondly, the provisions are not sufficiently similar for rational
comparison and the analyses made by the courts are specific to the
particular provisions.

Finally, any indemnity provision must

stand on its own and evidence a clear and unequivocal intent that
the indemnitee be indemnified for its own negligence.
D.

The Indemnity Provision In Ericksen v. Salt Lake City
Corp. Is Most Similar To The Indemnity Provisions Here.
The Court's Analysis In Ericksen Mandates Dismissal Of
ABP's Claim For Indemnification.

If ABP wishes to compare other indemnity provisions and the
analyses made by courts of those provisions, a comparison should
have been made with the provision found in Ericksen v. Salt Lake
City Corp. , 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). This appears to be the most
recent

analysis by the Utah Supreme Court of an

indemnity

provision where the indemnitee sought indemnification for its own
negligence. Interestinglyf this case was omitted from ABP's list
of comparison cases.

As Ericksen is a Utah case, and addresses

the purported indemnitee's reliance upon Freund v. Utah Power &
Light, the case warrants some attention. Moreover, the indemnity
provision at issue in Ericksen, unlike those in the cases recited
by ABP, is similar to the indemnity provisions here. The Ericksen
provision read as follows:
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The Contractor agrees to at all times protect,
indemnify, save harmless and defend the Cityf its agents
and employees from any and all claims, demands,
judgments, expenses, including reasonable attorney's
fees, and all other damages of every kind and nature
made, rendered or incurred by or in behalf of any person
or persons whomsoever, including the parties hereto and
their employees, which may arise out of any act or
failure to act, work or other activity related in any
way to the project, by the said Contractor. its agents,
subcontractors, materialmen or employees in the
performance and execution of this Agreement.
Ericksen, at 998 (emphasis added).
The court found the provision to be clear and that it
entitled the City to indemnification only when the claim arises
out of an act of the contractor or its agents, subcontractors,
materialmen, or employees in the performance and execution of the
agreement.

Id.

The court rejected

the City's claim for

indemnification for its own negligence, noting specifically that
the city's reliance on Freund v. Utah Power & Light was misplaced,
and that the contract of indemnity in Freund was much broader in
its sweep than that found in the Ericksen case.

Id.

Like the City's contention in Ericksen. ABP's reliance on
Freund, and its comparison of the Freund agreement to the
indemnity provisions in this case is misplaced.

ABP's reliance

upon the other cases cited from other jurisdictions is even
further misguided.

The indemnity provisions at issue here must

stand on their own and are easily construed under the strict
construction rule. The pertinent provision in the ABP Agreement
provides that Clark will indemnify ABP for particular losses
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"resulting directly or indirectly from [Clark's] performance of
this contract."

The provision in the Clark Agreement provides

that JB will indemnify Clark or the owner, WordPerfect Corp.,
against any loss incurred on account of any breach by JB of the
provisions of that contract*
similar to the
provisions

effect

cannot

The effect of the provisions is

of the provision

reasonably

be

in Ericksen.

interpreted

to

The

provide

indemnification for ABP's own negligence.
POINT IV
ABP'S ATTEMPT TO REWRITE ITS CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT
BETWEEN CLARK AND JB IN LIGHT OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
LAW SHOULD BE REJECTED. ABP SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
RAISE THIS ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND THIS
COURT SHOULD NOT REWRITE THE CONTRACT TO THE BENEFIT OF
ABP AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF EITHER CLARK OR JB.
A.

ABP's Argument That Utah's Liability Reform Act
Should Be Read Into The Indemnity Provisions Has
Been Raised For The First Time On Appeal And
Should Not Be Considered By This Court.

The essence of ABP's argument on appeal is that the indemnity
provisions should be rewritten by this Court to provide the
meaning urged by ABP in light of and under the circumstances of
the Liability Reform Act.

ABP asserts that since Utah law now

shelters ABP from any other party's negligence, the only purpose
for the indemnity provisions is to provide indemnification for
ABP,s own negligence.

While this argument is faulty for many

reasons, it should not be considered on appeal for the first time.
It was not raised below in any of the memoranda filed by ABP. It
is

fundamental that the trial court
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should have the

first

opportunity to address issues later raised on appeal, and that the
appellate court should decline to consider arguments raised for
the first time at the appellate level. Smith v. Iversen, 848 P.2d
677 (Utah 1993).

One exception to this rule of appellate review

is that the appellate court may affirm trial court decisions on
any proper ground, even though the trial court assigned another
reason for its ruling. Thus, an argument made for the first time
on appeal will be considered if it will result in affirmance, but
will not be considered if it will result in reversal.

See State

v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991).
One reason for this rule has been stated by the Utah Supreme
Court as follows:
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must
present his entire case and his theory or theories of
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he can
not thereafter change to some different theory and thus
attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of
litigation.
Bundv v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984),
quoting from Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 303,
470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970).
It should be noted that, whether the point raised by ABP is
characterized as a new argument or a new issue, consideration of
the point for the first time on appeal should be rejected.

The

Utah Supreme Court has declined to honor such a distinction,
noting that the concern is whether an argument was addressed in
the

first

instance

to the

trial
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court.

If

it was not,

consideration at the appellate level is precluded*

See, Ong

International (USA) v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455, n.31
(Utah 1993) .
ABP's argument concerning the effect of Utah's amendment to
the Comparative Negligence Law in 1986 should not be considered
here.

It was not raised below and is an entirely new issue or

argument.

Indeed, the argument raises factual issues concerning

whether or not the parties considered the effect of the Liability
Reform Act and whether or not the particular form contracts
utilized by ABP and Clark had in fact been amended at or near the
time of the Liability Reform Act or thereafter to account for the
change in the law.

This presents yet another reason why this

Court should refuse to consider this new issue. The injection of
new issues of fact into the appeal is improper and is reason to
reject consideration of the issue.

See Zions First Nat. Bank v.

National Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988).

On this

point, it should be noted that the ABP Agreement, although signed
by ABP and Clark in 1990, was the same form that had been utilized
by ABP on all of its projects for six years.
Clark, p.53, Exhibit I.)

(See depo of Stephen

The provision was therefore drafted

prior to the Liability Reform Act.
Under sound rules of appellate review, ABP's new argument
should not be considered.
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B.

The Court Should Not Rewrite The Indemnity
Provisions To Give Them The Legal Effect Desired
By ABP.

ABP asks this Court to construe the indemnity provisions to
give them the legal effect that ABP now desires. To bolster its
argument, ABP suggests that the indemnity provisions would be
rendered meaningless unless the provisions are read to clearly and
unequivocally indemnify ABP for its own negligence*

In effect,

ABP urges the Court to rewrite the indemnity provisions.

It is

not the function of the courts, however, to rewrite unambiguous
contracts, and the Court should not do so under the guise of
construction. Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co. 603 P.2d 803,
805 (Utah 1979).

See also Hal Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAmerica,

Inc. , 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). As recognized by the Kansas
Supreme Court in Fourth National Bank v. Mobile Oil Corp., 582
P.2d 236 (Kan. 1978), the basic legal principles on this point are
well-expressed in 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, § 242 (1964) pp. 627629, as follows:
It is a fundamental principle that a court may not make
a new contract for the parties or rewrite their contract
under the guise of construction. In other words, the
interpretation or construction of a contract does not
include its modification or the creation of a new or
different one.
It must be construed and enforced
according to the terms employed, and a court has no
right to interpret the agreement as meaning something
different from what the parties intended as expressed by
the language they saw fit to employ. A court is not at
liberty to revise, modify, or distort an agreement while
professing to construe it, and has no right to make a
different contract from that actually entered into by
the parties. Courts cannot make for the parties better
or more equitable agreements than they themselves have
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been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because
they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the
parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and
to the detriment of the other, or, by construction,
relieve one of the parties from terms which he
voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which
he did not.
Fourth National Bank, at 241.
The indemnity provisions at issue simply do not provide for
indemnification for ABP's own negligence. The "interpretation" of
the provisions in the manner suggested by ABP would result in a
rewriting of the provisions in violation of the above-stated
rules.

This Court should interpret the provisions as written.

They do not clearly and unequivocally express an intent to
indemnify ABP for its own negligence.
C.

The Indemnity Provisions Should Not Be Construed
In A Manner Simply To Render Them Legally
Effective. Where They Do Not Clearly And
Unequivocally Express An Intention To Indemnify
ABP For Its Own Negligence.

ABP argues that the ABP agreement should not be interpreted
in a way that renders it void.

It cites this Court to the

principle that in construing a contract, a construction giving an
instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be
adopted where reasonable, and between two possible constructions
that will be adopted which establishes a valid contract.
v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah 1976).

Stangl

This principle of

contract construction does not allow the Court to construe the
indemnity provisions in the manner urged by ABP simply to give the
provisions legal effect.

The strict construction rule requires
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that a party cannot be contractually indemnified for its own
negligence

unless

that

contractual

intent

is

clearly

and

unequivocally expressed• The rule of contract construction stated
in

Stangl

simply

provides

that,

as

between

two

otherwise

reasonable interpretations, preference may be given to the one
that will make the agreement lawful and valid. The principle does
not allow for a rewriting of the contract to give it legal effect.
Indeed, parties may not always intend that all provisions of an
agreement

have legal effect.

One party may intend that a

particular provision have a certain legal effect and another party
may intend that the provision have a different effect or no effect
at all.

Further, the parties may be wholly ignorant of the law

and of the legal effects that an agreement will produce. This was
recognized by Professor Corbin in his treatise on contracts as
follows:
As
between
two
otherwise
reasonable
interpretations, preference may be given to the one that
will make the agreement lawful and valid. It may be
true that parties usually intend to act lawfully and to
produce a legal effect by their agreement; but at times
they may consciously intend otherwise, and at other
times they be wholly ignorant of the law and of the
legal effects that an agreement will produce. Observe
further that interpretation and the determination of
legal effect are quite different processes.
n. b. Some language, when properly interpreted, may have
no legal effect, or a legal effect other than the
parties in fact intended. See Restatement, Contracts §
226, Comment c.
Corbin on Contracts, (One Vol. Ed.) §§ 545-554, p. 521 (1952).
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ABP also cites this Court to the premise that a contract
implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it was entered
and contends that if the Liability Reform Act is read into the
agreements, they must provide
negligence*

If

the

indemnification

principle

were

so

for ABP's own

broad,

contractual

provisions would be rewritten by the courts regardless of the
parties' intentions and regardless of whether or not the parties
had a meeting of the minds.

As Professor Williston stated, the

statement of the premise is too broad to be accepted without
qualification.

To assume, first, that everybody knows the law,

and, second, that everybody thereupon makes his contract and
adopts its provisions as terms of the agreement, is to pile a
fiction upon a fiction.

4 S. Williston, Williston on Contracts.

§ 615, p. 605 (3d ed. 1961).

The stated premise is not so broad

as to imply indemnification for another party's negligence where
the contract does not so provide.
Contrary to ABP's contentions, neither Utah law nor general
rules of contract construction require an interpretation that
would give particular provisions of a contract legal effect. Such
a stretch of contract interpretation principles would give rise to
a complete rewriting of the contract. ABP essentially urges this
Court to imply indemnification for its own negligence. This flies
in the face of the strict construction rule and the reasons for
the rule.
infra,

Further, as will be demonstrated herein, in Point V,

the legislature of the State of Utah has declared that
38

certain indemnification provisions in construction contracts are
indeed void, and have no legal effect.
D.

The Indemnity Provisions Are Not Meaningless As
Drafted,

ABP contends that Utah law now shelters ABP from any other
party's negligence, and that the indemnity clauses would be
meaningless unless they are read to provide indemnification for
ABP's own negligence.

ABP also cites this Court to Bosse and

Kirkpatrick for the proposition that the only reason for an
indemnity clause under current law is to protect the general
contractor from the consequences of its own negligence.

This

contention is simply false, and ignores other purposes for the
provisions.
Clark

For example, the indemnification provision in the

Agreement

with

JB

provides

for

obligations

and

responsibility for breach of contract as opposed to tort.

The

Clark Agreement provides that "the subcontractor shall indemnify
the contractor and the owner against, and save them harmless from,
any and all loss, damage, expenses, costs, and attorney's fees
incurred or suffered on account of any breach of the provisions or
covenants of this contract."

(Emphasis added.)

ABP's argument

and the Bosse court's reasoning ignore this most obvious purpose
for the provision.

If JB breached its contract in some manner by

failing to perform the work, or by improperly performing under the
contract, Clark could be held responsible to the owner and perhaps
others for such a failure on the part of JB to complete its
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contract*

The most obvious purpose of this indemnity provision is

to provide that JB will indeinnify Clark and the owner against such
loss.

To argue that the provision is meaningless unless it is

read to provide ABP or Clark with indemnification for their own
negligence in tort

is to ignore the clear language of the

agreement and the obvious legal effect thereof.
Another obvious purpose for the indemnity clauses is to
provide for expenses, costs, fines, etc., if the parties are
administratively sanctioned.

This purpose is equally clear from

the language of the agreement, and again does not relate to tort.
The other provision of the Clark Agreement at issue provides that
the subcontractor, JB, agrees to comply with the Occupational
Safety & Health Act of 1970, and further agrees to keep and save
the contractor, Clark, harmless from any claims or charges of any
kind by reason of the subcontractor, JB, failing to comply with
the Act.

JB agrees to reimburse the contractor for any fines,

damages, or expenses incurred by reason of the failure to comply.
The obvious purpose of this provision is to assure that JB will
pay any fines that are levied or other expenses incurred by reason
of OSHA violations by JB.

The provision cannot relate to tort

because failure to comply with OSHA regulations is not a basis for
tort damages.

(See the argument under Point III.A. above.)

The

provision is not meaningless and does not need to be redrafted to
give it meaning.

Indemnification for torts does not need to be
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implied or otherwise supplied contrary to the meeting of the minds
of the parties*
There are other possible reasons for the indemnity provisions
in the two contracts.1

JB does not attempt to set forth all

possible reasons for such indemnity provisions and establish the
legal effect, but submits that where any such indemnification is
claimed, the provision must be analyzed in that context to
determine if indemnification is provided for.

As noted, the

failure of a subcontractor to complete its work or to properly
perform its work may result in liability to the upstream parties,
which may give rise to indemnification under the provisions at
issue.

Under any circumstance, indemnity provisions must be

carefully analyzed.

Indemnification for one/s own negligence is

not the only possible purpose for such an agreement.
The indemnity provisions at issue are not meaningless, but
can apply to breaches of contract and administrative sanctions.
They do not need to be redrafted as urged by ABP to give them
meaning and life. They should be construed as drafted.

They do

*It should be noted that the contracts at issue may in fact
have been drafted with joint and several liability in mind, with
the design to shield the indemnitee from liability for the
negligent acts of others. Such a purpose was recognized in Brown
v. Boyer-Washinqton Blvd. Assocs., 856 P.2d 352 (Utah 1993). ABP
attempts to distinguish this case based upon the fact that the
contracts here were entered into after the Liability Reform Act.
The contracts were nevertheless drafted much earlier and the
indemnity provisions may have been formulated with joint and
several liability in mind. The ABP Agreement is on the same form
used by ABP on all the projects at the site for six years. (See
depo of Stephen Clark, p. 53, Exhibit I.)
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not, even by a liberal interpretation, provide that either Clark
or JB should indemnify ABP for its own negligence.
POINT V
ABP'S INTERPRETATION OF THE INDEMNITY PROVISIONS
REQUIRES AN INTERPRETATION THAT IS AGAINST PUBLIC
POLICY, AND IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-8-1.
Section 13-8-1 of the Utah Code provides that an agreement in
a contract related to construction purporting to indemnify the
promisee against liability for bodily injury or property damage
caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee is
against

public

policy

and

is void

and unenforceable.

The

legislature has thus declared that certain indemnity provisions
are indeed void and have no legal effect.

In such cases, the

provisions should not be rewritten by the courts. They are simply
declared void and unenforceable.
ABP seeks indemnification for its own negligence, and urges
an interpretation of the ABP Agreement and the Clark Agreement
that would provide

for such indemnification.2

There is no

reference to ABP's own negligence or fault in the pertinent
provisions of the contract,

and there is no broad

2

sweeping

ABP argues that it was not ABP's sole negligence that
caused the plaintiff's injuries. It references the underlying
pleadings where the plaintiff's complaint alleges negligence
against ABP, JB and Clark. It further references pleadings filed
by JB and Clark where allegations were made that the accident was
caused in part by the plaintiff's employer and co-employees. It
must be noted that the references made by ABP are to allegations
only. There was no finding made by the trial court apportioning
negligence.
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language providing for all-inclusive indemnification as was found
in Freund.
ABP contends that under Utah's current comparative negligence
law it can only be held responsible for its own negligence•

It

therefore follows that the indemnification sought by ABP in this
matter

is

indemnification

for

its

sole

negligence*

An

indemnification provision providing for such would be void under
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1•

ABP suggests, on the one hand, that it

can only be held responsible for its own negligence, while on the
other hand, contends that it is seeking indemnification for the
concurrent negligence of ABP and Clark, not for ABP's sole
negligence*

If ABP can only be held responsible for its own

negligence, then any indemnification sought must be for its sole
negligence and the indemnity provision violates Section 13-8-1.
More significantly, it is the interpretation of the indemnity
provisions urged by ABP that renders the provisions void under
Section 13-8-1.

The contracts do not expressly provide for the

indemnification urged by ABP.

If the general language of the

indemnity provisions is read to provide for such, they fail to
limit that obligation to situations where ABP is not the sole
responsible party.

Such an all-encompassing

provision is against public policy and void.

indemnification

In other words, to

read the indemnification provisions so broadly would mean that ABP
would be indemnified for not only its own negligence, but also its
sole negligence. This Court addressed this issue under different
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circumstances in Jacobsen Const, v. Blaine Const., 863 P.2d 1329
(Utah App. 1993).

ABP attempts to distinguish Jacobsen because

the agreement there limited the indemnification by excluding
situations where the indemnitee was actively negligent.

ABP

argues that because the ABP Agreement does not make a distinction
between active and passive negligence, the holding does not apply.
This argument is faulty.

The agreements in this matter are even

further removed from being valid. The provisions here do not make
any exclusion.

If they are read to indemnify ABP for its

negligence, there is no limitation and the broad reading would
include indemnification for sole negligence.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah also had an
opportunity to address this issue in Wollam v. Kennecott Corp.,
663 F. Supp. 268 (D. Utah 1987).

The following analysis by the

court is instructive:
In addition, paragraph eight fails to state that
Stockmar [the indemnitor] will not indemnify Kennecott
[the indemnitee] if Kennecott is the sole cause of an
injury or damage. Thus, if the general language is read
to provide indemnification for Kennecott's own
negligence, it fails to limit that obligation to
situations where Kennecott is not the sole responsible
party. In those circumstances, such an all encompassing
indemnification provision is "against public policy and
is void and unenforceable." Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1
(1986); cf. Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 625 F. Supp.
272, 278 (D. Utah 1985) (observing that the three
reported cases which apply Utah law and uphold an
indemnitor's obligation to cover for losses caused by
the indemnitee's own negligence, all involve explicit
reference in the contract to an exception where an
injury results from the sole negligence of the
indemnitee.)
Wollam, at 272 (brackets added).
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It is impossible to read the indemnity provisions at issue in
such a way to provide indemnification for ABP,s own negligence
without

allowing

an

interpretation

that

would

also

grant

indemnification for ABP's sole negligence. There is no exception
in the agreements for ABP's sole negligence, as there is no
reference whatsoever to ABP's negligence. Therefore, ABP's broad
interpretation

of

the

indemnity

provisions

encompassing and provide indemnification
negligence and ABP's sole negligence.
instances

where

ABP was

the

only

would

be

all-

for both ABP's own
It would even cover

party

at

fault.

As

a

construction contract, this violates Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. The
broad interpretation and rewriting of the provisions urged by ABP
therefore make the provisions void and unenforceable.
POINT VI
THE INDEMNITY PROVISIONS WERE NOT BARGAINED OR
NEGOTIATED FOR AT ARM'S LENGTH AND THEREFORE MAY BE
INVALIDATED AS VIOLATIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY.
ABP has no contractual privity with JB.

ABP attempts to

utilize its contract with Clark and also claims third-party
beneficiary status to the contract between Clark and JB in order
to obtain indemnification for its own negligence.

JB did not

draft either agreement and the agreements must be construed
against the drafter thereof.

Furthermore, as is typical in the

construction industry, equal bargaining does not exist in the
preparation of the construction contracts.

Subcontractors are

simply required to enter into the contracts prepared by the owner
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or general contractor.

The ABP Agreement in this matter is the

same contract that ABP used on all the projects at the WordPerfect
site in Orem, Utah.

(See depo of Stephen Clark, p. 53, Exhibit I;

depo of Ken Erickson, pp. 115, 154, 155, Exhibit J.)

It is seen,

for example, in this case that the contract between ABP and Clark
is on exactly the same form as the contract between ABP and Gene
Peterson Concrete. (See contracts attached to Amended Cross-Claim
of ABP Enterprises Against JB Sheet Metal, Inc., Clark Mechanical
Contractors, Inc., and Amended Third-Party Complaint Against Gene
Peterson, dba Gene Peterson Concrete, R. 1255-1212.)
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "an indemnity
agreement may be invalidated as violative of public policy where
shown to have resulted from duress, deception, a disparity of
bargaining power, or negotiations conducted at less than arm/s
length."

Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co. , 658

P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).

It can hardly be

argued that construction contracts such as those in this case were
negotiated at arm's length with equal bargaining power.

Any

indemnity provision therein may therefore be invalidated.
CONCLUSION
There is no expression whatsoever in the contracts of an
intent that JB should indemnify ABP for its own negligence. Such
indemnification should not be implied and the provisions should
not be rewritten to give them the legal effect now desired by ABP.
The district court did not commit error in granting summary
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judgment

in

favor

indemnification.

of
The

JB

dismissing

district

ABP's

court's

cross-claim

decision

should

for
be

affirmed.
DATED this J/^

day of

March

, 1994.

HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

rOHN N. BRAITHWAITE
attorneys for J.B. Sheet Metal,
Inc.
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ABP

DEVELOPMENT

COMPANY

CONTRACT
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 11th day of September, 1990, by and
between ABP Enterprises, Inc., dba ABP Development Company, of Orem, Utah, hereinafter referred
to as General Contractor, and CLARK MECHANICAL, of Provo, Utah, hereinafter referred to as
Sub-Contractor.
A. SPECIAL TERMS:
1.
Job Description: #910, Building K.
2.
The Sub-Contractor shall perform for the General Contractor at or near 1359 N, Res. Way,
Orem, Utah, the hereinafter described work, and under the conditions and terms contained herein.
3.
Work shall be commenced September 1,1990, diligently prosecuted, and completed by
February 1, 1991.
4.
General Contractor shall pay Sub-Contractor, in accordance with statements prepared by the
Sub-Contractor, a compensation of ($ 930,409.00), as specified under 2D (1) and (2).
B. GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1. PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK
(a) Specifications and Standards: SubContractor shall perform the work in accordance with (1) Uic
plans and specifications and exhibits, if any, for said job, and
(2) according to ail standards prescribed by law or by anybody
having the right to prescribe minimum standards.
( b ) P e r m i t s : Unless otherwise provided herein, SubContractor shall, at Sub-Contractor's sole cost and expense,
secure all necessary permits, make all cash or other deposits,
furnish all bonds, and give all notices required by law.

(c) Materials, Equipment, Labon Unless
otherwise provided herein, Sub-Contractor shall furnish all
material, utilities, supplies, tools, and equipment, and perform
all labor.
( d ) S a f e t y M e a s u r e s : Sub-Contractor shall take ail
reasonable precautions to protect the work, workmen, and the
public; and shall provide, where reasonably necessary, barriers,
guards, temporary bridges, lights, and watchmen.
( e ) Please see attached Exhibit "A" for specifications.

2. COMPENSATION
( a ) E x t r a W o r k : Sub-Contractor shall be entitled to
payment for extra work performed only if such work shall
have been previously authorized in writing by the General
Contractor.
( b ) T a x e s : The compensations provided herein includes
and Sub-Contractor shall pay all State and Federal payroll
taxes, including contributions or taxes assessed agninst
employees on wages earned, in connection with the work.
Sub-Contractor agrees lo indemnify General Contractor for alt
Huhility in connections therewith and to make all reports
required thereunder. The compensation also includes an
amount on account of all other taxes now or hereafter
imposed by any governmental authority upon, measured hy or
incident lo, the performance of this contract or the purchase,
storage, use or consumption by the Sub-Contractor of material
used in the performance of this contract
( c ) A c c e p t a n c e o f W o r k : Acccptincc shall be on the

date the work is completed to the General Contractor's
satisfactions. No payment hereunder shall constitute an
acceptance of defective work or improper materials.

(d) Terms of Payment: (l) At the end of each
calendar month during the progress of the work, and upon
completion of the entire work, Sub-Contractor shall be entitled
to receive eighty-five percent (85%) of the compensation
provided herein for the work performed during that month.
The balance shall be payable 35 days after acceptance, provided
there arc no undischarged or unsecured liens, attachments, or
claims in connection with the work. General Contractor may
require, as a condition to payment, that Sub-Contractor
submit evidence, by receipted bills or otherwise, that all costs
incurred for the work have been paid. (2) When payments arc
due as provided above, Sub-Contractor shall prepare
statements of amounts payable. Such statements shall show
the total compensation for the work performed to date, less
any previous payments.

3. DELAYS
The time for completion shall be extended for such period
that the Sub-Contractor is delayed by acts of God or the
elements, or by otlicr causes beyond Sub-Contractor's
reasonable control, including civil disorders and labor
disturbances.

4.INSPECTIONAPPROVAL,CANCELLATION
( a ) I n s p e c t i o n s : General Contractor shall have the
right to visit and inspect the work, or any part thereof, at all
times. Sub-Contractor shall keep a competent man in the
immediate vicinity of the work to receive communications
from General Contractor and to supervise the work.
( b ) A p p r o v a l : General Contractor may reject
materials, whether worked or unworked, and all portions of
the work which appear to be unsound or defective or failing in
any way to conform with the specifications hereof; SubContractor shall remove such rejected materials or portions of
the work from the premises within twenty-four (21) hours

after receiving notice thereof from General Contractor. If
removal of rejected materials or work should result in damage
to materials furnished by General Contractor, Sub-Contractor
shall furnish new materials of identical kind and quantity
without cost to General Contractor.
( c ) C a n c e l l a t i o n : (1) Should Sub-Contractor fail,
refuse, or neglect to supply sufficient material to be supplied
by Sub-Contractor hereunder; or tools, labor, or properly
skilled workmen to complete the work hereunder with
reasonable diligence and dispatch, for three (3) days after
written notice of such default to Sub-Contractor, the General
Contractor may at any time thereafter take over and complete
the work. The cost to the General Contractor of completing
such work shall be deducted from any moneys due SubContractor. If such cost exceeds any such moneys, SubContractor shall reimburse the General Contractor. (2)
Should the Sub-Contractor seek relief under any law for the
benefit of insolvents, or be adjudged as bankrupt, the General
Contractor may at any time thereafter terminate this
agreement and complete the work as provided in Section 4(C)(
1) hereof, except that any payments due from Sub-Contractor
to vendors for material supplied for work hereunder may be
made direct by the General Contractor to such vendors, and be
deducted from the amounts otherwise due to the SubContractor. (3) General Contractor may, at his absolute
discretion, stop the work at any time, but where SubContractor is not in default hereunder. General Contractor
shall pay Sub-Contractor for all work done in conformity with
the plans and specifications.

5. LIABILITY
( a ) G e n e r a l L i a b i l i t y : Sub-Contractor shall
indemnify and save General Contractor, its oCTicers or agents
harmless from and against any and all loss, damage, injury,
liability, and claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons,
and all loss of or damage to property of others, resulting directly or indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this
contract.

(b) Liability for Existing Property: SubContractor shall be liable to General Contractor for any loss
of or damage to existing property resulting directly or
indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this contract
to the extent of the applicable insurance which Sub-Contractor
has in force at the time of the occurrence and which shall not
be less than the amount provided in Section 6 hereof.

(f) A t t o r n e y ' s F e e s : Sub-Contntctor shall pay to
General Contractor a reasonable attorney fee, in any legal
action m which the General Contractor prevails, brought
against Sub-Con tractor based on a breach of this contract.

6. INSURANCE
Sub-Contractor shall maintain at all times during the
performance of work hereunder the following insurance in
companies and on terms satisfactory to General Contractor
(1) Workmen's Compensation Insurance, as prescribed or
permitted by law. (2) Property Damage, Liability Insurance,
indudingautomobile, covering property ofothers and property
of General Contractor other than the work performed under
this contract, in an amount not less that $1,000,000.00 for
each occurrence.

7. ASSIGNMENT
( a ) A s s i g n m e n t : This agreement shall not be
assigned, sublet, or transferred in whole or in part by the SubContractor, except with the previous written consent of the
General Contractor.

(b) Assignment by General Contractor, it
is expressly agreed that General Contractor may assign all of
its rights and interest hereunder to the owner, and that in
such event, Sub-Contractor shall continue in its performance
hereunder as if no assignment had been made.

8- CONTRACTOR'S UNDERSTANDING
It is understood and agreed that the Sub-Contractor, as the
result of careful examination, is satisfied as to the nature and
location of the work, the conformation and structure of the
ground, the character, quality, and quantity of the materials
to be used, the character of equipment and facilities needed
preliminary to and during the prosecution of the work, the
general and local conditions, and all other matters which can
in any way affect the work under this contract. No
representations by or oral agreement with any officer, agent,
or employee of the General Contractor, either before or aflcr
the execution of this contract, shall affect or modify any of the
Sub-Contractor's rights or obligations hereunder.
It is further understood and agreed that the Sub-Contractor
is bound and will comply with all the terms and conditions of
the labor agreements to which the General Contractor is a
party, insofar as said labor agreements lawfully require the
Sub-Contractor to be so bound.

(c) Liability for the Work Hereunder: SubContractor shall exercise due care and diligence in the conduct
of the work hereunder and in the care and protection of any
material or equipment furnished by General Contractor to
Sub-Contractor therefor. Such work, material, or equipment
lost or damaged byfire,storm, or any other cause whalsoevcr,
Sub-Contractor shall reconstruct, repair or replace.
( d ) E m p l o y e r ' s L i a b i l i t y : Sub-Contractor shall
perform the work hereunder in conformance with all
applicable Federal and State labor laws, and shall indemnify
and save General Contractor harmless from any and all
liability, claims, costs, and expenses of whatsoever nature
under such laws arising out of the performance of this
contract
( e ) L i e n s : Sub-Contractor shall discharge at once or
shall bond against all liens which may be filed in connection
with the work performed by Sub-Contractor, and shall save
the General Contractor and the owners of the premises upon
which the work is performed harmless therefrom.
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GENERAL CONTRACTOR:
ABP DEVELOPMENT GQJftPANY
By:
Dale:
COI:
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DEC o 51990 SUBCONTRACT AGRtfEMENT
1 » S AGREEMENTrn.deat

October
.,

.Utah.tbi.

_ t ,„90

ProVO/ Otah

b7Md ,,,,

d.y

„,-, „ ClarR Mechanical Contractors, Inc.

#kerelnafler

referred to as tie Contractor,and— J ' B< &*&

Metals Inc.
2487 South 3270 West West Valley City/ Utah 84119
rereinaftcr referred to at tit Subcontractor. We bind ourselves, oar tela, cecutors. administrators, auceessors. and assigE
jointly and aewaByfirmlyby tbese presents.
ItTTKESSETH: Hut for and In consideration of tbe eoreaaats kereb contained, tbe Contractor and tie Subcontract©
apre a* follow*:

1.

SCOPE OF WORK
Tb*t the worx to be performed by the Subcontractor tmder tie term* of this agreement consists of tie following:
Fumisbinf of all labor and material, tools, implements, and «qnipnieni,acaffoldint.permiU,fees,«tc-,tbdoall of t i e

following: Bldg. #9 Specs to apply/ 15000 General/ 15030 System commissioning/ 15042
Testing/ 15043 Balancing/ (Including I.D. and O&M)/ 15050 Basic Materials and
Methods/ 15180 Insulation (Ductwrap and breaching)/ 15800 Air distribution.
Total price (Including tax addenda, and alternate}....,

$297/903.00

TOien tie Subcontractor does sot Install all material furnlsbed ander this Subcontract and materiil as Is »ot Installed
fctobe delireredF.O.B

O

<r vv

TVj

.

.,...,

a

.r ..

,.

Brower & Associates

k> strict accordance mih the plans and specifications as prepared by.,

<£-. *~ "T5
V^v

Orem J o b s i t e

C/rciitSt and/or Enpneer. for the construction of

ToT

WordPerfect Corp.

WordPerfect Bldg. #10

m

_ _ Ofnaerf

for which construction the Contractor bis tbe prime coatncl trith tbe Oiraer; together trill all addeada or authorised
chin* es issued prior to tbe date of execution of this agreement.
The Contractor and the Subcontractor tfree to be bound by the terms of ibe prime contact agreement, construction
terulaiions, feneral conditions, plans and specifications, and any and all other contract documents. If any there bc t Insofar
as applicable to this subcontract tptmtnl, and to that portion of the worl herein described, to be performed by 1bt Subcontrielor.
In the event of any doubt or question arising between the Contractor and the Subcontractor with ropect to the pUns
and specification/ the it cision of the Architect and/or Engineer ahall be conduce and binding Should there be s o supertlibf architect orer thi worl. then the snatter In question shall be determined MI provided In Section 7 of the agreement.

Tut Subcontractor shaD pt
tte the work undertaken fa a prompt and «
>*nncr whenever suck work. Or any
part of it, becomes available, or u -ach other time or times as the Contractor may i
C and so as to promote the general
progress of the entire construction, and shall not, by delay or otherwise. Interfere with or hinder the work of the Contractor
or any other Subcontractor, and In the event that the Subcontractor neglect* and/or falls to supply the necessary labor
and/or materials, tools, Implements, equipment, e t c , in the opinion of the Contractor, then the Contractor ahall notify the
Subcontractor In writing setting forth the deficiency and/or delinquency, and five days after date of such written notice, the
Contractor shall have the right if he so desires to take over the work of the Subcontractor in full, and exclude the Subcontractor from any further participation in the work covered by this agreement; or, at his option the Contractor may take
over such portion of the Subcontractor's work as the Contractor shall deem to be in the best interest of the Contractor, and
permit the Subcontractor to continue with the remaining portions of the work. Whichever method the Contractor might elect
to pursue, the Subcontractor agrees to release to the-Contractor, for his use only, without recourse, any materials, tools.
Implements, equipment, e t c , on the site, belonging to or in the possession of the Subcontractor, for the benefit of the Contractor, in completing the work covered in this agreement; and, the Contractor agrees to complete the work to the best of
bis ability and in the most economical manner available to him at the time, Any costs incurred by the Contractor in doing
any such portion of the work covered by this agreement shall be charged against any monies due or to become due under the
terms of this agreement, and i s the event the total amount due or to become due under the terms of this agreement shall be
insufficient to carer the costs accrued by the Contractor in completing the work, then the Subcontractor and his sureties, if
any, ahall be bound and liable unto the Contractor for the difference.
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance of any work under this contract depend wholly or partially
npon the proper workmanlike or accurate performance of any work or materials furnished by the Contractor or other subcon*
tractors on the project, the Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary t o discover any such defects and report same In
writing to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which is so dependent; and shall allow to the Contractor a reasonable time In which to remedy such defects; and In the event he does not so report to the Contractor In writing, then It shall
be assumed that the Subcontractor has fully accepted the work of others as being satisfactory and he shall be fully responsible thereafter for the satisfactory performance of the work covered by this agreement, regardless of the defective work of
others.
The Subcontractor shall clean up and remove from the site as directed by the Contractor, all rubbkh and debris resulting from his work. Failure to clean up rubbish and debris shall serve as cause for withholding further^payment to Subcontractor until such time as, this condition Is corrected to the satisfaction of the Contractor. Also he shall dean up to the
satisfaction of the inspectors, all dirt, grease marks, e t c , from walk, ceilings, floors, fixtures, e t c , deposited or placed thereon
as a result of the execution of this subcontract. If the Subcontractor refuses or fails to perform this cleaning as directed by
the Contractor, the Contractor shall hare the right and power to proceed with the said flranfng, and the Subcontractor will
on demand repay to the Contractor the actual cost of said tabor pins a reasonable percentage of such cost to cover supervision. Insurance, overhead, e t c
The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the Contractor for any and all liquidated damages that may be assessed against
and collected from the Contractor by the Owner, which are attributable to or caused by the Subcontractor's failure to
furnish the materials and perform the work required by this Subcontract within the time fixed in the manner provided for
herein, and in addition thereto, agrees to pay to the Contractor such other or additional damages as the Contractor may
sustain by reason of such delay by the Subcontractor. The payment of such damages shaU not release the Subcontractor
from his obligation to otherwise fully perform this Subcontract.
Whenever it may be useful or necessary to the Contractor to do so, the Contractor shall be permitted to occupy and/or
use any portion of the work which has been either partially or fully completed by the Subcontractor before final Inspection
and acceptance thereof by the Owner, but such use and/or occupation shall not relieve the Subcontractor of his guarantee of
said work and materials nor of his obligation to make good at his own expense any defect in materials and workmanship which
may occur or develop prior to Contractor's release from responsibility to the Owner. Provided, however, the Subcontractor
shall not be responsible for the maintenance of such portion of the work as may be used and/or occupied by the Contractor,
nor for any damage thereto that is due to or caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor during such period of use.
Subcontractor shall be responsible for his own work, property and/or materials until completion and final acceptance of
the Contract by the Owner, and shall bear the risk of any loss or damage until such acceptance and shall pay promptly for
all materials and labor furnished to the project. In the event of loss or damage, he shall proceed promptly to make repairs, or
replacement of the damaged work, property and/or materials at his own expense, as directed by the Contractor. Subcontractor waives all rights Subcontractor might have against Owner and Contractor for loss or damage to Subcontractor's work,
property or materials.
It is agreed that the Subcontractor, at the option of the Contractor, may be considered as disabled from so complying
whenever a petition In Bankruptcy or for the appointment of a Receiver is filed against him.
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor .all the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor assumes
toward the Owner. The Subcontractor shall indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and g^y/c them harmless from,
any and all toss, damage, expenses, costs, and attorneys* fees incurred or suffered on account of any breach of the provisions
Or covenants of this contract.
Subcontractor sgreet to fully comply with the Occupational Safety £ Health Act of 1970 and any and ill regulations
issued pursuant thereto. Subcontractor as a term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and save the contractor harmless
from any claims or charges of any kind by reason of subcontractor failing to fully comply with the act and regulations and
agrees to reimburse the contractor for any fines, damages, or expense* of any kind incurred by the contractor by reason of
the subcontractor's failure to comply.

SURETY BONO
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4.

PERMITS, LICENSES, FEES. TAXES. ETC.

The Subcontractor shall, at his own cost and expense, apply for and obtain all necessary permits and licenses and ahall
.conform strictly to the laws and ordinances in force In the locality where the work under the project is being done, insofar
as applicable to work covered by this agreement. The Subcontractor shall hold harmless the prime Contractor against liability
by rc&Miu of the Subcontractor baring (ailed to pay federal, atate, county or municipal taxes.

6.

INSURANCE

The Subcontractor mgm* to provide and maintain workmen'* compensation insurance sod to comply In all reaped*
with the employment and payment of labor, required by any constituted authority baring legal jurisdiction over the area in
which the work k performed.
The Subcontractor agrees to carry comprehensive public liability and ptopcxty damage insurance, and such other
msurance'as the Contractor might deem necessary. In amounts aa approved by the Contractor. In order to protect the Con*
tractor and Subcontractor against loss resulting from any acts of the Subcontractor, his agents, and/or employees* Such
Insurance shall not be less than limits and coverages required In the general contract documents.
The Subcontractor agrees to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Contractor, of such insurance, including copies of the
policies, when requested to do so by the Contractor.
All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained In fuD force and effect In a company or companies satisfactory
to Contractor, shall be maintained at Subcontractor's expense until performance in full hereof (certificates of such insurance
being supplied by Subcontractor to Contractor), and such insurance shall be subject to requirement that Contractor must be
notified by ten (10) days' written notice before cancellation of any such policy. In event of threatened cancellation for nonpayment of premium. Contractor may pay same for Subcontractor and deduct the said payment from amounts then or sub•equently owing to Subcontractor hereunder.

6.

CHANGES. ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS

The Contactor may add to or deduct from the amount of work covered by this agreement, and any changes made in
the amount of work involved, or any other parts of this agreement, shall be by a written amendment hereto setting forth in
detail the changes involved and the value thereof which shall be mutually agreed upon between the Contractor and the Subcontractor if such be possible; and if such mutual agreement is not possible, then the value of the work shall be determined as
provided in Section 7 of this agreement. «Xn either event, however, the Subcontractor agrees to proceed with the work as
changed when so ordered in writing by the Contractor so as not to delay the progress of the work, and pending any determination of the value thereof.
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional work outside the scope of this contract unless terms hereof
ahall be conclusive with respect of this agreement between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall be made within one
week from date of completion.
The Subcontractor shall not sublet, transfer or assign this agreement or any funds due Or to become due or any part
thereof without the written consent of the Contractor.

7.

DISPUTES

In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope of the work, the dispute
ahall be settled in the manner provided by the contract documents. If none be provided, or if there arises any dispute concerning matters fa connection with this agreement, and without the scope of the work, then such disputes shall be settled by
a ruling of a board of arbitrstion consisting of three members, one selected by the Contractor, one by the Subcontractor and
the third member shall be selected by the first two members. The Contractor and Subcontractor shall bear the expense of
their selected members respectively, but the expenses of the third member shall be borne by the party hereto requesting the
arbitration in writing.
The Contactor and Subcontractor agree to be bound by thefindingsof any such boards of arbitration, finally and
without recourse to any court of law.

it 2V/,VQ3.
in snonthJy payment* of
^
% of the work performed in any preceding month. In accordance with estimates
prepared by the Subcontractor and as approved by the Contractor r-*
ArchiteCt/Owner
^
t
* auch payments to be made as payments are received by the Contractor from the Owner
covering the monthly tsilmiUt of the Contractor, Including the approved portion of the Subcontractor's monthly estimate.
In the event the Subcontractor does not submit to the Contractor such monthly estimates prior to the date of submit
aion of the Contractor's monthly estimate, then the Contractor shall include in his monthly estimate to the Owner for work
performed during the preceding month such amount as he aliaD deem proper for the work of the Subcontractor for the preceding month and the Subcontractor agrees to accept audi approved portion thereof as his regular monthly payment, as
described above.
The Subcontractor agrees to make good without cost to th* Owner or Contractor any and all defects due to faulty
workmanship and/or materials which may appear within the period so established in the contract documents; and if no such
period be stipulated in the contract documents, then such guarantee shall be for a period of one year from date of completion
of the project. The Subcontractor further agrees to execute may special guarantees as provided by terms of the Contract
documents, prior to final payment.
In the event It appears to the Contractor that the labor, material and other bills incurred in the performance of the
work are not being currently paid, the Contractor may take such steps as it deems necessary to assure absolutely that tue
money paid with any progrtu payment will be utilized to the full extent necessary to pay labor, material and all other bttls
incurred in the performance of the work of Subcontractor. Tbe Contractor may deduct from any amounts due or to become
due to the Subcontractor any sum or sums owing by the Subcontractor to the Contractor; and in the event of any breach by
the Subcontractor of any provision or obligation of this Subcontract, or in the event of the assertion by other parties of any
elnim o r ftrn agntnsl I f f Contractor or Contractor*» S u r e t y o r t h e premise* Arising out o f the Subcontractor** performance o f

this Contract, the Contractor shall have the right, but is not required, to retain out of any payments due or to become due to
the Subcontractor an amount sufficient to completely protect the Contractor from any and all loss, damage or expense therefrom, until the situation has been remedied or adjusted by the Subcontractor to the satisfaction of the Contractor. These
provisions thill be applicable even though the subcontractor has posted a full payment and performance bond.

9.

TERMINATION OF CONTRACT

In the event the prime contract between the Owner end the Contractor should be terminated prior to its completion,
then the Contractor and Subcontractor agree that an equitable eettlement for work performed under this agreement prior to
*uch termination, will be made as provided by the contract documents, if such provision be made; or9 If nonesuch exist, sext
by mutual agreement; or, failing either of these methods, by arbitration as provided in Section 7.

10-

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

During the pcrfonnanee of this subcontract, the Subcontractor agrees to nol discriminate against any employee bccau.se
of race, color, creed or national origin. As outlined in the Equal Opportunity Clause of the Regulations of Executive Order
10925 of March 6,1961 as amended by Executive Order 11246 of September 24,1965. The executive orders and the respective regulations are made a part of this subcontract by reference.

11. TERMS OF LABOR AGREEMENTS
It is hereby understood and agreed that for the work covered by this subcontract, the Subcontractor Is bound and
•will comply with the terms and conditions of the labor agreements to which the general contractor is a party, insofar as said
labor agreements lawfully require subcontractors tdlbe so bound.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Contractor and Subcontractor signify their understanding and agreement with the terms
hereof by affixing their signatures hereunto.

WTKESS:

Clark Mechanical Contractors/ Inc*
717 Colunibia Lane
Prove Utah 84604
J.B. Sheet Metal/ Inc,
{Subcontractor)

2487 south 3270 West •
(AddrcuJ

West Valley City/ Utah 84119
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Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc.

Shis statement i s attached and made a part of the ClarX Mechanical Contractors/, Inc. Subcontract Agreement:
(32) The federally assisted construction contractor certifies that he does
not maintain or provide for his employees any segregated f a c i l i t i e s a t any
of his establishments, and that he does not permit his employees t o perform
their services at any location. under his control f where segregated f a c i l i t i e s
are maintained. The federally assisted construction contractor c e r t i f i e s
further that he v i l l cot maintain or provide for his employees any segregated
f a c i l i t i e s at any of his establishments, end that he v i l l not permit h i s

_,i„
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segregated "facilities are oaintaincd. The federally assisted construction
contractor agrees that a breach of this certification i s a violation of the
Equal Opportunity clause in this contract. As used in this c e r t i f i c a t i o n f
the term "segregated facilities* 1 means any waiting rooms, vork areas, r e s t
rooms and vash rooms, restaurants and other eating areas, time d o c k s , locker
rooms and other storage or dressing areas, parking l o t s , drinking fountains,
recreation or entertainment areas, transportation, and-housing f a c i l i t i e s provided for employees vhich are segregated by explicit directive or are 'in f a c t
segregated on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin, because of
habit, local custom, or other reason. The federally assisted construction
contractor agrees that (except vhere he has obtained identical c e r t i f i c a t i o n s
froa proposed contractors for specific time periods) he-vill obtain i d e n t i c a l
certifications from proposed subcontractors prior to the award of subcontracts
exceeding $10,000 vhich are not exempt from the provisions of the Equal Opportunit
clause, and that he v i l l retain such certifications in his f i l e s .

Date

Stephen P« Clark President
Name and Title of Signer (Please type)
H3TE: 3he penalty for making f a l s e statements in offers i s prescribed
in 18 U. S. C- 1001

xnjoci.

SUBCONTRACT

CL

S E

To be added to Parag. 10 "Equal Employment Opportunity*

Clark Meciianical Contractors/, Inc. is a non-exempt federal contractor
and is subject to the following regulations: 41 <SR 60-1-4 (a) (7)*
41 CER 60-250*4 (m),( and 41 CER 60-741.4(f)*
Statement of Certification on Nbnsegregated Facilities (See Attachment*)
Also a part of this subcontract*
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD HEALEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
CASE NUMBER: 910400292 PI
A.B.P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Third-Party
Plaintiff
vs.

GENE PETERSON dba GENE
PETERSON CONCRETE
Third-Party
Defendant

The Court has received and fully considered the following motions now pending in
this case:
1.

A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of

1720

4.
5.

Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical Contractors Inc.
Clark Mechanical's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement.
A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of
Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal.
J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement.
A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement Against Plaintiff.

6.

Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing.

2
3.

The Court hereby denies the first motion enumerated above and accordingly grants
Clark Mechanical's cross-motion on the issue of indemnity. Based upon its interpretation of
the relevant terms of the contract between A.B.P. and Clark, the Court finds that the
indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties
that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. The contract's indemnity clause
clearly makes reference to liability that may arise from the subcontractor's performance.
Their is no similar reference to possible liability arising from the contractor's actions.
The Court would be inclined to deny the third motion enumerated above on similar
grounds, based upon the contractual language at issue. However, no contractual privity
exists between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal; and A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an
intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement between Clark and J. B. Sheet
Metal. Hence, the motion must be denied in any event.
With regard to the fourth and fifth motions enumerated above, the Court grants the
motions in part and denies them in part. Consistent with the Court' s prior ruling on Clark's
motion for summary judgement, the court rules that plaintiffs "Fifth Cause of Action" is
invalid to the extent that it is based on either implied or express provisions of the contract
between A.B.P. Enterprises and Clark Mechanical or the contract between Clark Mechanical
and J.B. Sheet Metal. Based upon its interpretation of the contracts, the Court rules as a
matter of law that plaintiff was not an intended third-party beneficiary of such contracts. See

1719

Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981); and Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). Although the contracts provide generally
for the implementation of safety measures, the terms of the contracts cannot reasonably be
interpreted as evidencing the intent of the parties to directly benefit the plaintiff in this case.
Any benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff due to the parties' contractual obligations of safety would
clearly have been incidental.
The Court further grants defendants' motions for summary judgement against plaintiff
to the extent that plaintiff may be attempting to assert his second and third claims (involving
alleged OSHA violations) as independent causes of action. The Court must agree with
defendants that no independent action exists for the breach of OSHA standards.
However, the Court denies the fourth and fifth motion enumerated above to the extent
that defendant's seek to have plaintiffs second and third claims dismissed. In order to
avoid procedural or formal difficulties that may arise, the Court will not dismiss plaintiffs
second and third causes of action. The Court notes that while OSHA violations may not be
the basis for an independent cause of action, evidence of such violations may be permitted as
evidence of negligence (i.e. evidence of the relevant standard of care and the possible breach
thereof). Accordingly, plaintiff's second and third causes are not to be regarded as alternate
causes of action but rather alternate bases upon which negligence may be found.
The Court is inclined to grant defendants' motions for summary judgement with
regard to plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action on the basis that the facts involved in this case
doe not appear to be legally sufficient to support plaintiffs claim of an "inherently dangerous
condition." However, the Court will reserve its ruling on this issue until all the evidence has
been introduced at trial.

1718

Finally, finding no need or justification for reconsideration of the issues disposed of
in its prior ruling in this case, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing, filed
January 22, 1993.
Counsel for defendant J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court.

cc:

Brent D. Young, Esq.
Edward P. Moriarity, Esq.
Lynn C. Harris, Esq.
Raymond M. Berry, Esq.
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq.
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
John N. Braithwaite, Esq.
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County State of Utah

CARMA B ^ I M

ffi?
Deputy

Robert R. Wallace, #3366
John N. Braithwaite, #4544
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD HEALEY,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., a
Utah corporation, and A.B.P.
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC.,
Defendants.

A. B. P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah Corporation, dba ABP
Development Company,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene
Peterson Concrete,
Civil No. 910400292PI
Third-Party
Defendant.

Judge Harding

The following motions have been received and have been
submitted for decision by the Court in this action:

1. A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion
Judgment

on

Issue

of

Indemnity

for Partial

Against

Clark

Summary

Mechanical

Contractors, Inc•;
2.

Clark

Mechanical's

Cross-Motion

for

Summary

Judgement;
3.

A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion

for Partial

Summary

Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal;
4.

J.B.

Sheet Metal's Motion

for Partial

Summary

5.

A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion

for Partial

Summary

Judgment;

Judgment Against Plaintiff; and
6.

Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing.

The Court, having

reviewed

each

of

the

foregoing

motions, the memoranda filed in support thereof and in opposition
thereto by the parties, having reviewed the relevant law, being
fully advised in the premises, and finding good cause therefor,
HEREBY ORDERS that A.B.P. Enterprises' ("A.B.P.") Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. ("Clark") is denied, and Clark's
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P.'s claim for indemnity
is granted. The Court finds that the indemnity provisions of the
contract between A.B.P. and Clark make reference to liability that
may arise from Clark's performance of the contract, but cannot
reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties
that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that A.B.P.'s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal is
denied.

There is no contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B.

Sheet Metalf and A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an
intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity provisions of
the contract between Clark and J.B. Sheet Metal.

The Court

further finds that the indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be
interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties that J.B.
Sheet Metal indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and A.B.P.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Against Plaintiff are granted in part and denied in part
as follows:
1.

Consistent with the Court's prior ruling on

Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment, summary judgment is granted
in favor of J.B. Sheet Metal and A.B.P. and against plaintiff on
plaintiff's

Fifth

Cause

of

Action.

The

Court

rules

that

plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action is invalid to the extent that it
is based on either implied or express provisions of the contract
between A.B.P. and Clark or the contract between Clark and J.B.
Sheet Metal.

The plaintiff

was

not

beneficiary of either of the contracts.

an intended

third-party

Although the contracts

provide generally for the implementation of safety measures, the
terms

of

the

contracts

cannot

reasonably

be

interpreted

as

evidencing the intent of the parties to directly benefit the
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plaintiff.

Any benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff due to the

contractual obligations of the parties would clearly have been
incidental.
2.

The Court further grants summary judgment in favor

of all the defendants and against plaintiff on plaintiff's Second
and Third Causes of Action to the extent that the plaintiff
alleges the Second and Third Causes of Action as independent
causes of action•
exists

The Court finds that no independent action

for the breach

of OSHA

standards.

Evidence

of

OSHA

violations may not be the basis of an independent cause of action,
but may be permitted only as evidence of negligence.

However, the

Court does not dismiss plaintiff's Second and Third Causes of
Action.

They are not alternate causes of action, but rather

alternate bases upon which negligence may be found.
3.

With regard to all the motions for summary judgment

on plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action, the Court finds that the
facts

involved

in

this

action

do

not

appear

to

be

legally

sufficient to support plaintiff's claim of an inherently dangerous
condition.

However, the Court reserves its ruling on this issue

until all of the evidence has been introduced at trial.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

that

plaintiff's

Rehearing, filed January 22, 1993, is denied.

Motion

for

The Court finds no

need or justification for reconsideration of the issues disposed
of in its prior ruling.

-4-

DATED this

7

day of / y > ^ M .

,

JLE RAY M. HARDINC-J ^
District Court: *jtadge^( -;
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

RAYMOND M. BERRY
Attorney for A.B.P.
Enterprises

iL-i L
7

(L^ys-crcny

GLENN C. HANNff
Attorney for Clark
Mechanical

LYNN C. HARRIS
Attorney for plaintiff
Richard HeaJ

MARK DALTON DUNN
Attorney for Gene
Peterson Concrete

nfa*

tOHN N. BRAITHWAITE
Attorney for J.B.
Sheet Metal
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD HEALEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
CASE NUMBER: 910400292 PI
A.B.P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Third-Party
Plaintiff
vs.
GENE PETERSON dba GENE
PETERSON CONCRETE
Third-Party
Defendant

The Court has received and fully considered J.B. Sheet Metal's Cross-Motion for
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Summary Judgement on A.B.P's Cross-Claim Against J.B. Sheet Metal, together with both
supporting and opposing memoranda. In its February 10, 1993 memorandum decision, the
court ruled as follows:
The Court hereby denies the first motion enumerated above [A.B.P. Enterprise's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical
Contractors Inc.] and accordingly grants Clark Mechanical's cross-motion on the issue of
indemnity. Based upon its interpretation of the relevant terms of the contract between
A.B.P. and Clark, the Court finds that the indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be
interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s
own negligence. The contract's indemnity clause clearly makes reference to liability that
may arise from the subcontractor's performance. Their is no similar reference to possible
liability arising from the contractor's actions.
The Court would be inclined to deny the third motion enumerated above [A.B.P.
Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B.
Sheet Metal.] on similar grounds, based upon the contractual language at issue. However,
no contractual privity exists between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal; and A.B.P. has failed to
establish that it is an intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement between
Clark and J. B. Sheet Metal. Hence, the motion must be denied in any event.
Upon finding no evidence of contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet
Metal, and upon denying A.B.P.'s "Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of
Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal," the Court has already implicitly ruled on all issues
necessary to the disposition of J.B. Sheet Metal's pending motion. Accordingly, the Court
hereby grants the motion, finding that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding
A.B.P.'s cross-claim for indemnity against J.B. Sheet Metal and that J.B. Sheet Metal is
entitled to judgement on the issue as a matter of law.
Counsel for defendant J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court.

Dated this j?/xfrdav of June, 1993.

cc:

Brent D. Young, Esq.
Edward P. Mortality, Esq.
Lynn C. Harris, Esq.
Raymond M. Berry, Esq.
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq.
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
John N. Braithwaite, Esq.
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FILED
ft>orthJu<i(cia»D»3trict Court

. Deputy

Robert R. Wallace, #3366
John N. Braithwaite, #4544
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.Co
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD HEALEY,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs<
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., a
Utah corporation, and A.B.P.
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC.,
Defendants.

A. B. P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah Corporation, dba ABP
Development Company,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs<
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene
Peterson Concrete,
Civil No. 910400292PI
Third-Party
Defendant.

Judge Harding

The court, having reviewed and fully considered J.B.
Sheet Metal, Inc.'s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P.
Enterprises' Cross-Claim Against J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc., together

with both supporting and opposing memoranda, and having previously
ruled on these issues as raised by A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet
Metal, being fully advised din the premises, and finding good cause
therefor,
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that J.B. Sheet
Metal, Inc.'s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P. 's CrossClaim Against J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. is granted.

There is no

contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc., and
A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an intended third-party
beneficiary of the indemnity provisions of the contract between
Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. The
Court

further

finds

that

the

indemnity

provisions

cannot

reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties
that J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own
negligence.

DATED this /l3 day o £ ^ 2 ^ S 1993.

fiO^RABLER&Y M / HARPING/ ~
Fpusth District Couirh, Judge
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TILED !K
4TR DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH

OCT 5 4nPIH3
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD HEALEY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 910400292 PI
DATE: October 4 , 1993

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al.,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Joe Morton
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for ruling on Clark Mechanical's motion for
Judgement on Its Cross-Claim against J.B. Sheet Metal, and J.B. Sheet Metal's Cross Motion
for Summary Judgement on Clark Mechanical's Cross-Claim for Indemnity. Having
received and considered both motions, together with memoranda both in support and in
opposition to the motion, the Court hereby enters judgement and grants J.B. Sheet Metal's
Motion for Summary Judgement. As indicated in earlier memoranda, the Court finds that
the contractual language does not require J.B. Sheet Metal to indemnify Clark Mechanical or
A.B.P. Enterprise for A.B.P.'s own negligence.
Counsel for J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no
effect until such order is signed by the Court.
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Dated this 4th day of October, 1993.

HARDING, JUDGI
^

ex:

Brent D.Young, Esq.
Lynn C. Harris, Esq. * \
Raymond M. Berry, Esq?
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
Robert R. Wallace, Esq.
Paul S. Felt, Esq.
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Robert R. Wallace, #3366
John N. Braithwaite, #4544
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD HEALEY,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., a
Utah corporation, and A.B.P.
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC.,
Defendants.

A. B. P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah Corporation, dba ABP
Development Company,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene
Peterson Concrete,
Civil No. 910400292PI
Third-Party
Defendant.

Judge Harding

The court, having reviewed and fully considered Clark
Mechanical's motion for judgment on its cross-claim against J.B.
Sheet Metal, and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc.'s cross motion for summary w i O J

judgment on Clark Mechanical's cross-claim against J.B. Sheet
Metal,Inc., together with both supporting and opposing memoranda,
and having previously ruled on these issues as raised by A.B.P.
Enterprise's motion for partial summary judgment on issues of
indemnity against Clark Mechanical and J.B. Sheet Metal, being
fully advised in the premises, and finding good cause therefor,
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

That J.B. Sheet Metal Inc.'s cross motion for

summary judgment on Clark Mechanical's cross-claim against J.B.
Sheet Metal, Inc. is granted. The Court finds that the indemnity
provisions cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any
intent of the parties that J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. indemnify Clark
Mechanical for Clark Mechanical's own negligence or for A.B.P.
Enterprise's own negligence.

Clark Mechanical's cross-claim

against J.B. Sheet Metal is dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Clark Mechanical's motion

for summary

judgment

against J.B. Sheet Metal is hereby denied.
DATED this /fi

day of / ^ g ^

1993.

+Zt44*j
,E RATM. HARDING
D i s t r i c t Court Ji

V

\

\
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Approved as to form:
STRONG & HANNI

Glenn C. Hanni
(I
H. Burt Ringwood ^
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

V. ^ W X ^

robert Wallace
John N. Braithwaite
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A

Uh-huh.

Q

You signed it?

A

Yes.

Q

And as I understand it, this is a contract that—

a similar contract that has been used on the different
buildings out at the WordPerfect site?
A

As far as we're concerned, yes.

Q

Is it any different than the other ones that you

remember signing, in form?
A

This contract is the same contract that we've

entered into with ABP on all the projects.
Q

Six years?

A

Yes.

Q

For, I can't remember how many, ten or plus

buildings?
A

As far as I recall.

Q

Down under performance of the work under d, do

you see that under safety measures?
A

Okay, yes.

Q

It says—and under this contract you are deemed a

subcontractor, yes?
A

Right.

Q

Up at the top, ABP is the contractor?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

Says, "Subcontractor shall take all reasonable

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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Q

Next on page 44 and 45, what I received, this

apparently was just a blank of the standard ABP Development
Company contract?
A

Yes.

Q

Apparently this is on a computer, you just bring it

up and fill in the blanks?
A

I don't do that.

Q

Is that legal who does that?

A

Pardon?

Q

Does legal do that or one of your assistants?

A

One of the girls in the office that does the

contracts up.
Q

Let's next go to page 46.

It says "Meeting 8-8-90,

Consultation, Dale Stevenson, OSHA - Safety."
Was this where you invited them out?

It's hard to

see what that little diagram is.
A

Yes.

It's where we invited them out and where they

broke that down into what OSHA does now, they do consultation,
they do inspection and they do training.
diagram in the corner was.

That's what the

That's the notes I took.

Q

These are your notes?

A

From that meeting, yes.

Q

Are these issues that you remember you wanted to

talk with him about or just issues that he brought up?
A

We asked him to do the meeting and those were the

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
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A

Do we do part of his work for him?

Q

Right.

A

No.

Q

All you do is see that it is done correctly?

A

The foreman on the job does, yes, and helps him with

scheduling and things like that.
Q

Is the contract that is signed, particularly this

one for Building 10 between ABP and Gene Peterson, is that the
entire agreement between the two parties?
A

Do you consider when he signs his mechanic's lien

releases, is that part of the contract?

Do you contract that

because there is that document that when he receives his check
he signs.
Q

That releases you of the liens?

A

The liens and stuff like that.

Q

But there's nothing else, there's not oral

agreements, there aren't any other written agreements
somewhere else that I may not know of that would come into
play?
A

I don't know of any.

Q

Do you know who created this?

Was this created by

ABP, this contract?
A

I don't know exactly.

It's been basically, with

some revisions, the same contract when Horman Construction was
doing work for —
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Q

But it was not something that would have been

created by any of the subcontractors?
A

Not that I know of, no.

Q

Was there ever a time during the work performed on

Building 10 that Gene Peterson Concrete did not have its
insurance in such a manner that it was acceptable to ABP?
A

Not that I know of. At that time I wouldn't have

probably been told unless there was something serious about
it, because I didn't handle that part of it at that time.
Q

Has anybody told you that that was the situation?

A

No, not that I can recollect.

Q

Under the contract, who is the employer?

You may

want to look at Section 5, subsection (d), it says "Employer's
liability."

That's the only place I can find where an

employer is even referenced here.

I don't know who an

employer in this contract would be.
MR. BERRY:

He's asking you for a legal opinion.

If

you don't know the answer to it, tell him no, you have no
opinion.
THE WITNESS:

I really don't know that.

It

specifies subcontractor and general contractor on down, but I
don't know.
Q

(BY MR. DUNN)

Where the contract talks about the

subcontractor's performance of this contract, would that go
into anything that ABP was required to do?
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